The present paper aims at presenting and discussing a naturalistic version of the representational computational theory of mind (r-c.t.m.). In this paper the term “mind” refers to any complex system whose outputs (behaviours) are characterized by reasonability and intentionality. According to the r-c.t.m., the human brain is a mind continuously creating and containing representations of objects in two forms: image - like and proposition - like representations. Brain representations per se, may be largely distributed functional webs of neurons; each web, as a whole, is either in a state of activation or in a certain degree of readiness for activation. The brain representations are constantly composed from simpler ones, via the recursive engagement of a finite number of programs, either innate or created through learning mechanisms. Concerning proposition - like representationsthere may be programs that classify the representations of linguistic objects (i.e. words, phrases) into lexical or syntactical categories and combine them according to grammatical patterns. In the present text, some indices (psychological, neuroscientific, from the domain of linguistics and artificialintelligence) are presented that are supportive of the r-c.t.m.; furthermore some weak points of this theory are discussed along with some alternative views concerning the representational activity of the brain.
Key words: mind, brain, rationality, prepositionality, representations
M. Livaditis (page 31) - Full article (Greek)